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The Framers of the Constitution believed that form was an im-
portant determinant of governmental performance, and they estab-
lished in the first four articles of the Constitution an elaborate
structure that gave the executive and legislative branches specific roles
to fulfill.' The Framers believed that this structure would promote
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Many modern students of government do not accept the political
theories of the 18th century, particularly the idea that form is an
important determinant of governmental performance. The modern
student prefers to view government as a by-product of culture, po-
litical conflict, economic forces, or the accidents of history. This
Article does not challenge the modern conception of government,
but it does defend and support the political discoveries of the 18th
century. Even today, the peculiar shape of United States government
influences foreign and domestic policy, just as the Framers thought
it would.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1977 the constitutional calculations of the 18th
century had a direct bearing on the conduct of foreign policy in the
* Partner, King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. LL.B. 1948, Mercer University.
Attorney General of the United States, 1977-79. As Attorney General, Mr. Bell
participated in various phases of the Panama Canal transaction.
** Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. A.B. 1967, Uni-
versity of North Carolina; M.A. 1968, Harvard University; J.D. 1973, University
of Virginia. Attorney-advisor, Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department
of Justice, 1977-81. Professor Foy assisted in the preparation of opinions given by
the Attorney General in connection with the Panama Canal transaction and testified
before Congress concerning the legal issues involved.
' U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
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United States. The Constitution gave the President power to make
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. 2 Pursuant to this
power, President Carter had proposed that the United States should
make treaties that would transfer the Panama Canal to Panama in
the year 2000.1 Although the citizens of the United States disliked
this proposal," informed observers believed that the Senate would con-
sent to the treaties after a period of resistance and deliberation.' Thus,
if the President and Senate possessed the constitutional authority to
transfer the Canal by treaty, the transaction would probably go
forward. On the other hand, the Constitution gave the House of
Representatives, acting in concert with the Senate, power "to dispose"
of territory of property belonging to the United States.' If, as a con-
stitutional matter, the President needed an act of Congress to transfer
the Canal, the political outlook was grim. With congressional elec-
tions fast approaching, there was little likelihood that the House of
Representatives would support a proposal so strongly opposed in the
nation at large.7
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties"); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 11 ("[The Congress shall have power] to declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water").
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
President Carter announced the proposal formally and ceremoniously in Wash-
ington on September 7, 1977. At the largest gathering of foreign dignitaries since
the funeral of President Eisenhower in 1969, he initiated two treaties that his
negotiators had concluded with Panama. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1977, at A14,
col. 1. These treaties, the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the
Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, called for the dismantling
of the Panama Canal Zone, the eventual transfer of control of the Canal to Panama,
and the establishment of a permanent regime of neutrality for the Canal. See 16
I.L.M. 1021-98.
4 Shortly after the announcement of President Carter's proposal, nationwide
polls showed that an overwhelming majority of United States citizens disapproved
of the plan to transfer control of the Panama Canal to Panama. See SENATE SUBCOMM.
ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE PROPOSED PANAMA CANAL
TREATIES: A DIGEST OF INFORMATION 560-61 (Comm. Print 1978). Louis Harris also
conducted a poll in October, 1977. He found that United States citizens in every
section of the country rejected the Treaty by a wide margin. Id. at 576-77.
1 Vote counters within the Administration were not absolutely certain of victory
in the Senate, but they believed that the opponents of the proposal did not, in
September, have enough votes to defeat it. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1977, at A3, col.
1. In September of 1977, James Reston, relying upon Washington sources, predicted
that no more than 20 senators would vote against the proposal in the end. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1977, at E17, col. 1.
6 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
1 There is no official record of the sentiment in the House in the late summer
of 1977, but subsequent events left no doubt that the House intensely disliked the
President's proposal. In June and July of 1979, a full year after the Senate had
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Thus, supporters and opponents of the President's plan found
themselves on opposite sides of a constitutional argument. The sup-
porters contended that the President and Senate could dispose of the
Canal by treaty, without an Act of Congress. The opponents argued
that Congress alone had the power to authorize the transfer, and
therefore, any action would require approval by the House. The fate
of the Canal hung in the balance. United States policy in the Car-
ibbean appeared to depend on the allocation of decision-making
authority within our government, which in turn depended on the
meaning and force of a framework of government designed two
centuries ago.
The President eventually won the constitutional argur.ent. The
Senate consented to the treaties, and the transaction went forward
as the President had proposed, in spite of House opposition. It was
a textbook case, a classic illustration of the importance of form in
American government. We will review the case in the paragraphs
below, explain why the transaction developed as it did, and evaluate
the outcome in light of the Framers' design.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Planning of the Panama Canal
The first attempts to build a canal across Panama came from
Europe. Europeans recognized the need for a direct water route from
the Atlantic to the Pacific through Central America, and at various
times during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, they made concrete
plans for construction of such a waterway.' These plans came to
nothing. In 1879 Ferdinand de Lessups, the man of genius who built
the Suez Canal, organized the last European effort. With the unquali-
fied support of the French establishment, he formed a private com-
pany, raised millions of francs, and set about to construct a sea-level
consented to ratificiation of the Panama Canal Treaty, a working majority of the
House either (1) voted against implementing the Treaty, (2) said that they would
have voted against the Treaty if they had been asked to approve it in the first
instance, or (3) said that their colleagues should vote for implementation only because
the ratified Treaty committed the United States to a course from which it could
not honorably or easily withdraw. See infra notes 168-73.
8 For an account of early proposals to construct an isthmian canal, see M. Du
VAL, CADIZ TO CATHAY: THE STORY OF THE LONG DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE FOR THE
PANAMA CANAL (2d ed. 1947). See also D. MCCULLOUGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE
SEAS 19-44 (1977).
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canal through the Isthmus of Darien in Colombia (now Panama).
This adventure ended in bankruptcy and scandal in 1889.1
The problem was essentially logistical. To build a canal through
the isthmus, it was necessary to settle a large number of people in
an inhospitable wilderness, keep them alive, and move an enormous
amount of equipment and earth in an efficient, predictable way. The
French never solved these problems. But engineers in the United
States had faced similar problems in building the transcontinental
railroads and had succeeded in overcoming them. Moreover, during
the Spanish-American War the Army Medical Corps had developed
new techniques for preventing and controlling the tropical diseases
that had plagued the French in Panama. By the end of the 19th cen-
tury the United States possessed the knowledge necessary to build a
canal through the isthmus. All that remained was the opportuntiy
and the will to act.' 0
At the turn of the century, several events conspired to stimulate
a United States interest in construction of an isthmian canal." First,
the Spanish-American War demonstrated the military need for a direct
passage through the isthmus. 2 Second, the acquisition by the United
States of the Phillipines and the Hawaiian Islands made the need for
a passageway even more pressing. 3 Third, if the United States was
to be a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power, it would need to move
its forces from one hemisphere to the other. To accomplish this, it
would need a path between the seas. Finally, an isthmian canal would
serve the commercial interests of a nation seeking trading partners
in the Orient. The clipper ships had been constructed to shorten the
I David McCullough has written an interesting account of the de Lesseps en-
terprise, from the formation of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique
de Panama to the criminal prosecution of Ferdinand de Lessups for fraud in 1893.
See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 45-241.
,0 See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 124-203, 405-26, 468-89.
1, See generally Baxter & Carroll, Working Paper: The Panama Canal, in THE
PANAMA CANAL: BACKGROUND PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH HAMMAR-
SKJOLD FORUM 8-9 (L. Tondel ed. 1965) [hereinafter Baxter & Carroll]. Earlier in
the 19th century, various United States citizens, including some within the govern-
ment, had shown an interest in constructing an isthmian canal either through Panama
or through Nicaragua. See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 30-44.
,2 The Oregon was in San Francisco bay when the Maine blew up in Havana
harbor. She was ordered to proceed directly to the Caribbean. Because there was
no water passage through the isthmus, she sailed 12,000 miles around the Horn, a
journey that the nation followed through the newspapers with mounting interest.
Sixty-seven days after leaving San Francisco she arrived off the coast of Florida in
time to participate in the engagement at Santiago Bay. See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra
note 8, at 254-55.
'1 Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 9.
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voyage from New York to China. A canal through the isthmus would
make the voyage shorter still.
In 1902 and 1903, Secretary of State John Hay entered into ne-
gotiations with Tomas Herran, the Colombian Ambassador to the
United States, to obtain the right to construct a canal through the
remote Colombian province of Panama. 14 In 1903 Hay and Herran
signed a treaty calling for construction of such a canal (the Hay-
Herran Treaty.' 5 This Treaty, while favorable to the United States,
was unfavorable to Colombia. Although the United States Senate
consented to its ratification, 16 the Colombian Senate unanimously
rejected it on August 12, 1903.1
The United States did not lose interest in the project. In September
and October of 1903, certain persons in Panama and Washington
contrived to secure the secession of Panama from Colombia and to
obtain for the United States the right to construct a canal across the
isthmus. Surprisingly the principal architect of this plan was a French-
man, M. Phillippe Bunau-Varilla. Bunau-Varilla had been an engineer
for the failed de Lessups Company and was personally interested in
the successful completion of an isthmian canal. 8 With the help of
William Nelson Cromwell, a New York lawyer, Bunau-Varilla had
lobbied hard for passage of the Spooner Act' 9 and adoption of the
Hay-Herran Treaty. When the Hay-Herran Treaty was rejected by
the Colombian Senate, he set about to protect his interests through
other means. On November 3, 1903, pursuant to his plan, a small
number of Colombians living in Panama declared their independence
from Colombia and seized facilities of the Colombian Government
in Colon. On the same day, the United States gunboat Nashville
arrived at Colon harbor and prevented the landing of Colombian
14 The negotiation proceeded upon the assumption that the United States would
purchase the assets of the French company that had succeeded to the interest of
the defunct de Lessups company, together with the right that the Colombian gov-
ernment had granted to the French to construct a canal through Panama. Thus,
the purchase would involve payments to the equity holders of the French company
as well as to Colombia, which had authority to approve or disapprove any transfer
of the French interest. See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 331. The Spooner
Act had authorized the purchase of the French interest in principle. See Act of June
28, 1902, ch. 1302, 32 Stat. 481 (1902).
,1 D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 332.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 339.
81 See Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1302, 32 Stat. 481 (1902). Bunau-Varilla held
an equity position in the French firm that succeeded to the interest of the original
de Lessups company after its liquidation, and he stood to gain from a United States
buy-out. See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 289-90.
'9 See Act of June 28, 1902, ch. 1302, 32 Stat. 481 (1902).
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troops sent by ship to reinforce the garrison in Panama. Three days
later the United States recognized the new Republic of Panama.
Twelve days after this formal recognition, John Hay and Bunau-
Varilla signed a treaty (the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty) in Washington
granting the United States the right to construct an isthmian canal.
Bunau-Varilla had drafted the Treaty himself, and he signed the
Treaty on behalf of the Republic of Panama as its minister pleni-
potentiary. 20 This remarkable transaction, beginning with the rejection
of the Hay-Herran Treaty on August 12, 1903, and culminating with
the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty on November 18, 1903,
took only three months to complete.
B. The Canal and the Canal Zone under the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty
To understand the issues presented by President Carter's proposal
in 1977, one must understand the regime created by the Hay-Bunau-
Varilla Treaty. In November, 1903, John Hay had offered to conclude
a treaty with Panama on terms identical to those contained in the
Hay-Herran Treaty. 21 But Bunau-Varilla, in his desire to guarantee
United States acceptance of the Treaty, drafted a document that was
even more favorable to the United States. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty improved on the Hay-Herran Treaty in four important respects.
First, the Hay-Herran Treaty had granted the United States a right
to construct a canal through a zone only ten kilometers wide, while
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted the United States a right to
construct a canal through a zone ten miles wide. 22 Second, the Hay-
Herran Treaty had imposed a term of 100 years on the rights and
privileges granted to the United States under that Treaty. The Hay-
Bunau-Varilla Treaty, however, granted those rights "in perpetuity." '23
Third, the Hay-Herran treaty had expressly preserved the sovereignty
20 D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 361-402. The Senate gave its consent to
ratification of the Treaty on February 23, 1904, and the Treaty entered into force
in accordance with its terms. Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, Nov. 18, 1903,
United States-Panama, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431.
23 See Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 48 (remarks of Ambassador Joseph
Farland).
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama,
art. II, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431. For a comparison of the Hay-Herran Treaty
and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, see Baxter & Caroll, supra note 11, at 48
(remarks of Ambassador Joseph Farland).
23 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, Nov. 18, 1903, United States-Panama,
art. II, 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431.
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of Colombia over the Canal Zone, but the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty
provided that within the Zone the United States would have the
rights, power and authority that it "would possess and exercise if it
were the sovereign of the territory.' '24 Finally the Hay-Herran Treaty
had provided that Colombia was to retain jurisdiction over various
kinds of cases arising within the Zone. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty contained no such provision. 25
Bunau-Varilla's imaginative revision of the Hay-Herran Treaty cre-
ated many benefits and difficulties for the United States over the
next sixty years. The right to exercise sovereign power over a United
States Zone in Panama was the peculiar feature of the arrangement.
Although similar zones existed in other parts of the world, 26 the rights
granted to the occupying countries often were usually limited to a
term of years. 27 The creation of a perpetual United States Zone in
Panama was unusual, and it raised a question about the essential
character of the remarkable events of 1903.
In 1904 John Hay suggested that the Republic of Panama had
retained "titular sovereignty" over the Canal Zone, even though the
United States had acquired a right to exercise perpetual sovereign
power within the Zone. 28 In 1936, in an effort to describe the rela-
tionship in a way that would not offend Panamanian sensibilities,
the United States and Panama agreed that the Zone was the "territory
of the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States
of America." ' 29 This formula was a triumph of diplomacy but did
little to explain the true nature of the United States - Panama re-
lationship. Teddy Roosevelt described the relationship in plain lan-
guage. When called upon to explain what had happened in Panama
in 1903, he said simply, "I took the Isthmus." ' 30
24 Id. at art. III.
23 See Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 48.
26 European spheres of influence in China were legitimated in part by "lease"
agreements that gave colonial powers the right to exercise sovereign authority within
specified territories. See, e.g., Convention Respecting the Lease of Kiaochow, Mar.
6, 1898, Germany-China, 1 TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING
CHINA, 1894-1919 at 112 (MacMurray ed. 1921); see generally Baxter & Carroll,
supra note 11, at 12.
2 Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 12.
28 Id. at 13.
20 General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936, United States-
Panama, art. III, 6, 53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945.
30 The President made this remark in an address given at the University of
California at Berkeley in 1911. The remark is quoted and explained by David
McCullough. See D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 383-84.
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C. Growing Difficulties
The Republic of Panama was a poor country from the very be-
ginning, and it had ceded its greatest natural resource to the United
States under the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The United States made
annual payments to Panama in consideration of the Treaty, and many
Panamanians earned their livings by working in the Zone; but as the
national consciousness of Panama grew, the arrangement designed
by Hay and Bunau-Varilla came under increasing scrutiny. The
prosperity of the United States citizens living in the Zone evidenced
the enormous advantages the United States enjoyed as a result of
the Canal. This prosperity contrasted with the poverty of the sur-
rounding countryside and was a source of embarrassment to Pan-
amanians. In 1936 and 1955, in recognition of the need for change,
Panama and the United States made various minor adjustments in
their relationship, 3 although the basic framework established by the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty endured. It was only a question of time
before a more fundamental change would become necessary.
In 1962, at a time when the principal objective of United States
foreign policy in Latin America was to prevent "another Cuba,"
Panamanian President Chiari met with President Kennedy in Wash-
ington. The two leaders agreed that their countries would take a
symbolic step to recognize Panama's residual sovereignty over the
Canal: they agreed that the Panamanian flag would be flown "in an
appropriate way in the Canal Zone." '3 2
United States citizens living in the Zone did not share President
Kennedy's enthusiasm for promoting good relations with Panama,
and they promptly challenged the flag agreement in court.3 3 United
States authorities in the Canal Zone awaited the outcome of this
litigation before implementing the agreement. The implementation
which follow;ed in January, 1964, pleased no one. Rather than di-
ll See General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936, United States-
Panama, 53 Stat. 1807, T.S. No. 945; Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Co-
operation, Jan. 25, 1955, United States-Panama, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
32 Joint Communique of President Kennedy and President Chiari of Panama,
June 13, 1962, 47 Dep't State Bull. 81 (1962).
33 See Doyle v. Fleming, 219 F. Supp. 277 (D.C.Z. 1963). The residents of the
Zone were not alone in their opposition to symbolic concessions. In 1960, in § 201
of the Department of Commerce Appropriation Act, Congress had forbidden the
expenditure of funds for a pole to fly the Panamanian flag in the Zone. See
Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1961, Pub. L.
No. 86-451, § 201, 74 Stat. 93, 101 (1960).
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recting that the Panamanian flag be flown beside the American flag,
the governor of the Canal Zone ordered the American flag removed
from certain locations, including Balboa High School. Students at
the high school protested the decision and raised the American flag
in front of the school in defiance of the ban. This action sparked a
series of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations that eventually
led to a major confrontation between the two countries."
In response to the action of the American students, Panamanian
students entered the Canal Zone on January 9, 1964, and attempted
to raise their own flag beside the American flag in front of the
school.35 A riot ensued, and for the next three days violent disturb-
ances occurred in the Canal Zone and in Panama involving civilian
and military personnel from both countries.16 The violence resulted
in substantial property damage and a loss of life on both sides.3 7 The
Government of Panama promptly recalled its ambassador to Wash-
ington, charged the United States with an "unprovoked armed attack"
against Panama and its people,38 and demanded emergency meetings
of the Organization of American States under Article 6 and 9(a) of
the 1947 Rio de Janeiro Pact,3 9 and of the Security Council of the
United Nations under Articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations
Charter.4 ° Thereafter, Presidents Johnson and Chiari conferred by
telephone and agreed to use the good offices of the Inter-American
Peace Committee to resolve the crisis.41
Over the next three months, through various diplomatic means,
the two countries attempted to restore normal relations. Panama
insisted that restoration of normal relations would require a com-
mitment by the United States to negotiate a new treaty. Although
the United States refused to meet this demand, it did signal a will-
ingness to "discuss" pertinent issues. 42 Eventually the two countries
14 The entire incident was described in meticulous detail in a report issued by a
committee of the International Commission of Jurists, which investigated the incident
at the request of the National Bar Association of Panama. Baxter & Carroll, supra
note 11, at 60-91.
11 Id. at 69.
36 Id. at 71-82.
37 Id.
11 Id. at 4.
11 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838.
40 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
41 Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 4.
42 Id.
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agreed to begin a process of reconciliation, and on April 3, 1964,
issued a joint declaration to that effect. 43 This declaration marked
the beginning of protracted negotiations between the two countries
which spanned the administrations of Presidents Johnson, Nixon,
and Ford, and culminated in President Carter's 1977 proposal.
D. Issues Involved in the Negotiation
From the Panamanian point of view, three major issues confronted
the two countries in the mid-1960s: money, dignity, and sovereignty. 44
Panama received only $1.9 million annually from the operation of
the Canal, 45 an inadequate sum by any standard. Moreover, the United
States was using the Panama Canal Company to dominate most of
the subsidiary businesses operating within the Zone. Although the
two nations had agreed to open markets in the Zone to Panamanian
businesses, progress along these lines was slow.46 Individual Panama-
nians seeking employment within the Zone encountered similar dif-
ficulties. In previous years the treatment of non-American workers
in the Zone was discriminatory as a result of official policy. In the
wake of the Treaty of 1955, however, many of the old practices were
eliminated. Nevertheless, Panamanians still complained that offical
41 The declaration reads as follows:
In accordance with the friendly declarations of the President of the United
States of America and of the Republic of Panama of the 21st and 24th of
March, 1964, respectively, annexed hereto, which are in agreement in a
sincere desire to resolve favorably all the differences between the two
countries;
Meeting under the chairmanship of the President of the Council and
recognizing the important cooperation offered by the Organization of Amer-
ican States through the Inter-American Peace Committee and the delegation
of the General Committee of the Organ of Consultation, the representatives
of both Governments have agreed:
1. To re-establish diplomatic relations.
2. To designate without delay special Ambassadors with sufficient powers
to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict between the two
countries without limitations or preconditions of any kind.
3. That therefore, the Ambassadors designated will begin immediately
the necessary procedures with the objective of reaching a just and fair
agreement which would be subject to the constitutional process of each
country.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1964, at 2, col. 4.
" For a concise contemporaneous description of the issues involved in the ne-
gotiation, see Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 26-31.
41 See Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, United
States-Panama, art. I, 6 U.S.T. 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
46 Baxter & Carroll, supra note 11, at 28-30.
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policy reserved the best jobs in the Zone for United States citizens."
Finally, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty provided for perpetual United
States dominion over an American colony in the center of Panama.
This issue lay at the very heart of the negotiations since no Panama-
nian political leader could afford to support the continuation of the
existing arrangement."
The United States viewed the negotiations in a different light.
Recent events had proved that the old treaty arrangement was prob-
lematical from the standpoint of United States foreign policy in Latin
America. The essential question was whether modification of the old
arrangement would improve the Panamanian situation and serve the
interests of the United States. The United States needed stability in
Latin America, the ability to use and defend the Canal in time of
war, and assurance that the Canal would continue to be an efficient
and inexpensive instrument of international commerce in time of
peace. In light of these interests, negotiators for the United States
had to determine the extent to which the United States could prudently
accede Panamanian demands for increased control.
The joint declaration of April 3, 1964, stated that the objective of
the negotiations was to reach a "just and fair agreement . . . subject
to the constitutional process of each country. 4 9 This statement re-
flected an understanding by both nations that any agreement reached
by the negotiators was provisional, reserving the ultimate question
of implementation or rejection for each nation in accordance with
its own constitutional process.
The Constitution of the United States establishes an elaborate
process for the approval and implementation of international
agreements. Although the proper resolution of the policy issues depends
on the expertise and wisdom of the negotiators, the implementation
of any new agreement depends on the operation of this constitutional
process within the United States. The following paragraphs will review
this process and show how the structure established by the Framers
determined the fate of the Panama Canal.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
In plain, unqualified phrases the Constitution defines governmental
powers and assigns them to certain bodies and officers, creating a
41 Id. at 27-28.
41 Id. at 30-31.
41 N. Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1964, at 2, col. 4.
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political structure that has lasted longer than any comparable structure
since the middle ages. In general, the provisions dealing with foreign
relations grant certain powers to Congress, certain powers to the
President, and certain powers to both the President and Senate. These
provisions are discussed briefly in the paragraphs below.
A. Powers Granted to Congress
The Constitution grants various powers to Congress that bear
directly on the conduct of foreign affairs. 0 Among these powers,
article IV, section 3, of the Constitution expressly provides that
Congress shall have power "to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States." 51 No one has ever questioned the applicability
of this provision to international transactions involving the disposition
of United States territory or property. For this reason, article IV,
section 3, played an important role in the controversy surrounding
the Panama Canal transaction.5
On the face of the constitutional text, the authority of Congress
in the field of foreign affairs is enormous. The powers described in
article I, section 8, are impressive in themselves; and the general
power conferred by the "necessary and proper" clause exhausts the
field. Under this clause, if the government of the United States has
power to take any action in the field of foreign affairs, Congress
has authority to make a law carrying that power into execution. In
1914 the United States negotiated a treaty with Great Britain to
protect migratory birds. 3 Subsequently, Congress passed a statute to
'o U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Under article I, section 8, Congress has power (1) to
lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, id. at cl. 1; (2) to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, id. at cl. 3; (3) to establish a uniform rule of naturalization,
id. at cl. 4; (4) to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas and offenses against the law of nations, id. at cl. 10; (5) to declare war, id.
at cl. 11; (6) to grant letters of marque and reprisal, id.; (7) to make rules concerning
captures on water, id.; (8) to raise and support armies, id. at cl. 12; (9) to provide
and maintain a navy, id. at cl. 13; (10) to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces, id. at cl. 14; (11) to provide for calling
forth the militia to repel invasions, id. at cl. 15; and (12) to make all laws that are
"necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the foregoing powers or any
other power vested by the Constitution in any department or officer of the United
States, id. at cl. 18.
11 Id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
52 See infra notes 180, 184-85 and accompanying text.
11 Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United States-
Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
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enforce the treaty within the United States.54 Because the Constitution
did not state that Congress had power to make laws protecting
migratory birds, the statute was challenged on the ground that it
exceeded the power of Congress under article I, section 8. But the
Supreme Court, in Missouri v. Holland," found the treaty to be a
sensible measure dealing with a natural subject of negotiation between
nations. Therefore, as a constitutional matter, since the treaty was
within the authority of the United States Government, Congress had
the power to enforce that treaty by statute under the necessary and
proper clause of the Constitution.5 6
Judicial decisions and congressional practice have enlarged the
powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. For example,
the courts have held that Congress, in the exercise of legislative
jurisdiction over international transactions, need not make the nec-
essary legislative judgments itself. Instead, it may delegate its legis-
lative power to the President or to executive officers, who may then
make rules or orders carrying the force of law.57 Vast bodies of
federal legislation depend upon this principle. Moreoever, the courts
have said that Congress, by statute, may authorize the President or
other executive officers to enter into binding agreements with foreign
nations.58 This interesting proposition suggests that a majority of the
House and Senate, with the President's approval, may accomplish
by legislation what two-thirds of the Senate and the President may
accomplish under the treaty clause.5 9
14 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918).
5 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
56 Id.
11 The leading case is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). Throughout our history the Supreme Court has upheld generous dele-
gations of legislative authority in the field of foreign affairs. See, e.g., Hampton &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Most recently, the Supreme Court upheld the President's formidable legislative powers
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp.
IV 1980), in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
58 See, e.g., Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1883) (postal conventions); see
also B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912) (congressionally au-
thorized international agreement a "treaty" within meaning of statute).
19 Professor Henkin asserts that an international agreement authorized by a simple
majority of both houses of Congress is "a complete alternative to a treaty." L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1972). He notes that such
agreements avoid the potential "veto" of one-third of the Senate under the treaty
clause. Id. He further asserts that the constitutionality of such agreements is "estab-
lished." Id. at 176.
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There are certain limitations on congressional authority in the field
of foreign affairs. Congress may declare war, 6° but it may not forbid
speech criticizing war. 6' Congress may regulate foreign trade, 62 but
it may not authorize unreasonable searches and seizures to enforce
the regulation.63 In short, Congress may not use its powers to do
anything that the Constitution forbids. Moreover, Congress has no
authority to exercise powers that only the President or the President
and the Senate may exercise. Thus, Congress may pass a law creating
a foreign service, but it has no power to pass a law appointing an
ambassador to the Court of St. James. The Constitution vests the
power of appointment in the President and the Senate. 64 Although
the Constitution does not expressly deny the power of appointment
to Congress, the express grant to the President and the Senate im-
plicitly excludes Congress.
Finally, when Congress exercises power in the field of foreign
affairs, its actions must assume a form appropriate to the legislative
function. Perhaps this is the most important limitation on congres-
sional competence in the field. Congress may (1) pass laws, (2) make
declarations, (3) appropriate money, (4) delegate authority, and (5)
gather information necessary to fulfill its legislative function. But
Congress may not extend its authority beyond these legislative func-
tions. In particular, Congress may not negotiate with foreigners, an
essential function in the conduct of foreign affairs. 65 As a matter of
constitutional principle, only the President, the President's ambas-
sadors, and other executive officers of the United States may represent
the United States in its dealings with foreign nations.
B. Powers Granted to the President
The President is the "sole organ" of the United States in the
conduct of foreign affairs. 66 He and his executive officers are the
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
6 See id. at amend. I.
62 See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
63 See id. at amend. IV.
64 See id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6S See L. HENKIN, supra note 59, at 174.
66 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(quoting John Marshall, as a member of Congress, 10 ANNALs OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
For an extended discussion of the "sole organ" concept, see L. HENKIN, supra note
59, at 45-50. The Constitution also provides that the President shall be commander-
in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
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only persons entitled to speak and act for the United States in
diplomatic matters. This principle is implicit in a constitutional struc-
ture which separates executive and legislative power. Moreoever, the
Constitution does not require the President and his ministers to retain
the confidence of the legislative branch as they speak and act for
the United States in diplomatic matters. During the President's term
they enjoy a measure of independence unknown in other western
democracies. This unique constitutional status places an enormous
burden upon these officers, since the conduct of foreign policy is the
most important responsibility of the federal government.
Like Congress, the President cannot do anything forbidden by the
Constitution, and his competence to act in the field of foreign affairs
is limited by the character of his office. He is the Chief Executive,
and his actions must assume a form appropriate to the executive
function. The President can execute the laws of the United States,
but he cannot make the laws. He can spend money, but he cannot
appropriate money. He can wage war, but he cannot declare war.
Similarly, he alone cannot make treaties. Here we come to the last
and most important point.
C. Powers Granted to the President and the Senate Together
The Constitution provides that the President shall have power to
appoint ambassadors, consuls, and other officers of the United States,
and to make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate.
67
The second power, the treaty power, is the one that concerns us here.
It was the legal foundation for the Panama Canal transaction, and
from an historical standpoint, it is the most interesting and revealing
power created by the Constitution. During the 1770s and 1780s, replacing
the government of Great Britain with a new United States government
was the central political problem facing this country. To solve this
problem, as between the perils of monarchy on the one hand and
the perils of pure democracy on the other, the Framers chose a
republic, a middle course. This political design is most evident in the
treaty clause.
1; that he shall receive the ambassadors and public ministers of foreign nations, id.
at § 3; that he shall from time to time give Congress information on the state of
the Union and recommend useful legislation, id.; and that he shall "take care that
the laws of the United States are faithfully executed." Id.
67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
1. Exclusion of the House of Representatives from the Treaty
Power
The Articles of Confederation gave Congress the power to make
treaties for the United States"8 and forbade individual states to make
treaties without congressional consent. 69 Under the Articles, Congress
was composed of a single house containing delegates appointed for
various terms by the state legislatures. Each state delegation had one
vote.70 Under this arrangement the United States made various treaties,
including the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which recognized the political
independence of the United States from Great Britain. 7' The dispo-
sition of the treaty power under the Articles reflected the political
realities of the times. The United States, under the Articles, was a
confederation of states which had banded together to deal with the
American Revolution and had consented to the creation of certain
joint governmental powers. The Articles vested these powers, legis-
lative and executive, in Congress, which exercised them in accordance
with the votes of the state delegations.
For reasons largely unrelated to the conduct of foreign policy, the
Articles of Confederation proved to be unworkable. In the summer
of 1787, twelve of the thirteen states sent special representatives to
Philadelphia to revise the Articles. These fifty-five delegates worked
in secrecy through the summer and drafted a new and enduring
document, the Constitution.
The delegates did not engage in full discussion of the treaty power
until late in their deliberations. The debate began with consideration
of a committee draft which stated that "the Senate of the United
States shall have power to make treaties,"17 2 and that such treaties
were "laws" of the United States. 73 Some delegates, Colonel George
Mason in particular, had expressed reservations on the question of
giving the Senate power to make treaties. 74 Moreover, John Francis
Mercer had suggested that a treaty should not become a law until
6 ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX, cl. 1.
69 Id. at art. VI, cl. 1.
70 Id. at art. V, cis. 1-4.
1, Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 80, T.S.
No. 104.
712 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 392 (M. Farrand ed.
1911). The draft had been prepared by the Committee of Detail. See id. at 177,
183.
73 See id. at 183.
14 Id. at 297-98.
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"ratified by legislative authority. '75 Therefore, the delegates had to
decide whether to give the treaty power to the Senate or to the Senate
and House of Representatives together.
After expressing doubt that the Senate should play any role at all
in the treaty-making process, Gouverneur Morris proposed that if
the Senate were to have this power, no treaty should be binding on
the United States unless ratified by a bill passed by both houses and
approved by the President. 76 James Wilson observed that this proposal
was consistent with the treaty practice of Great Britain, where treaties
were subject to the approval of Parliament. 77 James Madison corrected
Wilson on this point 78 and went on to make two proposals of his
own. First, he proposed that the President should be involved in the
treaty-making process.7 9 Second, he proposed that the Constitution
should distinguish between two categories of treaties: those requiring
full legislative approval and those requiring only the approval of the
President and the Senate. 0 After hearing these objections and pro-
posals, the convention voted on August 23, 1787, to recommit the
first draft of the treaty clause.8 '
Thereafter, the committee revised the draft to state that "[tihe
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
have power to make treaties . . . . But no Treaty shall be made
without the consent of two thirds of the members present." 82 When
the convention took up the revised draft, James Wilson proposed
that the words "and the House of Representatives" be included after
the word "Senate." 83 Following a brief debate, the delegates rejected
Wilson's motion.8 4 By the end of the day, the delegates approved
the revised committee draft of the treaty clause in its entirety.85
The records of the convention do not explain why the delegates
excluded the House from the treaty-making process. Madison and
McHenry recorded only a portion of the relevant debate, primarily
71 Id. at 297. Gouverneur Morris, in a later debate, made a similar proposal. Id.
at 392.
76 Id.
7' Id. at 393.
71 Id. at 395.
79 Id. at 392.
10 Id. at 394.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 498-99, 538-40.
11 Id. at 538.
84 Id.
81 Id. at 550.
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the remarks of the delegates who opposed the formula eventually
adopted. As for the majority, the record is largely silent. Thus, there
is little direct evidence of the majority's purpose and intention. What
speaks loudest in the record are the votes of the states. The treaty
clause was not a controversial provision, and on the issue of House
exclusion, the majority prevailed by a margin of ten states to one.8 6
It is likely that two reasons swayed the minds of the majority.
First, the exclusion of the House made sense in terms of the internal
politics of the convention. The delegates were all Americans, but they
did not feel bound to one another by common citizenship, common
laws, or even a common culture. They represented twelve separate
and diverse states, and each state wanted to protect its interests. The
essential problem was to establish and preserve a balance of power
between the large and small states. This problem loomed large in
virtually all of the deliberations in Philadelphia, and it obviously was
involved in the competing proposals concerning the treaty clause. The
original proposal gave the treaty-making power to the Senate, assuring
each state an equal voice in the formulation of United States foreign
policy. Wilson's proposal to include the House of Representatives in
the treaty-making process would have given large states a greater
voice in the process to the detriment of small states. A desire to
preserve the principle of equal representation for each state in the
conduct of foreign affairs probably motivated the decision to exclude
the House of Representatives from the treaty-making process. 7
Second, the political theories of the 18th century contributed to
the exclusion of the House. The Framers thought that governmental
structure would influence governmental performance. Thus, because
they believed that structural independence would encourage impartial
judgment, they gave the judicial power to a separate branch of
government and decreed that federal judges should hold office for
life during good behavior.8 8 Similiary, they gave the power of the
purse to the House of Representatives, the body closest and most
responsive to the people.8 9 The people could be trusted to hold reliable
opinions concerning the purse, and a body elected directly by the
people could be trusted to make sound financial decisions. Finally,
the Framers gave the treaty power to the President and the Senate.
Id. at 538.
87 See id. at 393 (remarks of John Dickinson).
88 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
89 Id. at art. I, § 7.
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Foreign policy was a delicate matter, requiring discretion, expertise,
detachment, judgment, and constancy of purpose. The people and
their representatives in the House would not possess these qualities;
the Senate would possess them, because of its structure. Therefore,
the Senate was a safe repository for the treaty power. The Framers
explained and defended this theory, not in the record of their debates
during the convention, but in The Federalist.90
- The relevant essays are Number 10 (by James Madison), 62 and 63 (probably
by Madison), and 64 (by John Jay). In these four short pieces, Madison and Jay,
both distinguished lawyers, explain their basic theory of republican government,
their conception of the Senate and its special place in the constitutional system,
their view of the treaty power, and the reasons for giving that power to the President
and the Senate.
In essay Number 10, Madison explains the difference between pure democracy
and the republican form of government envisioned in the Constitution. Pure de-
mocracy, which places governmental decision-making power with the people, is
susceptible to numerous maladies. THE FEDERALIST No. 10. at 69-72 (J. Madison)
(C. Beard ed. 1948). It encourages party conflict, a combative spirit among the
people, and legislation by special intersts. Id. at 69-71. A pure democracy sacrifices
the public good to the interests of powerful groups. By contrast, the Constitution
establishes a government in which a system of representation expresses the interests
and views of the people. Id. at 72-73. This system, according to Madison does the
following:
refine[s] and enlarge[s] the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interests of the country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under
such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced
by the represenatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public
good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the pur-
pose.
Id. at 73. For a helpful analysis of Madison's theory of representation, see G. WILLS,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALISTS 179-264 (1981).
According to Madison's thesis in Numbers 62 and 63, the Senate, an unrepre-
sentative body, plays a crucial role within this system of representation. The Senate,
because of its relatively small size, the length of the terms of its members, and the
manner of their election, acquires expertise unattainable by the House, whose mem-
bers are "called" for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, [and] continued
in appointment for a short period. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 264 (J. Madison)
(C. Beard ed. 1948). Moreover, the Senate provides stability and continuity in
government. Id. at 264-65. Stability is a precondition to domestic tranquility, eco-
nomic prosperity, and the esteem of foreign powers. Id. at 265. Finally, and most
importantly, the Senate protects United States citizens from their own occasional
delusions. Madison wrote:
To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as
those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution
(i.e., the Senate) may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people
against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate
sense of the community ought, in all governments, ultimately prevail over
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Although The Federalist does not provide conclusive or even suf-
ficient answers to many constitutional questions, it helps us under-
stand the Constitution. It explains what the Framers thought about
the Constitution and the relationships it sought to establish. With
regard to the treaty clause, The Federalist teaches that the exclusion
of the House of Representatives from the treaty-making process was
a conscious decision rooted in a theory of government. The Framers
wanted to establish a republic, not a pure democracy, to serve public
interests through a system of representation that would enable the
government to pursue prudent policies in the face of occasional public
opposition. Within this system they reserved delicate and difficult
foreign policy decisions for the Senate, the body best suited to deal
with them.
2. Legal Significance of the Exclusion of the House of
Representatives
The legal conclusion to be drawn from history is simply that the
President and two-thirds of the Senate have power to make treaties,
the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs
when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit
advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men,
may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most
ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will
be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in
order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow mediated
by the people against themselves, until reason, justice and truth can regain
their authority over the public mind? Id. (emphasis added).
In essay Number 64 John Jay relied upon these arguments to defend the treaty
clause, an "unexceptionable" clause in his view. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 272
(C. Beard ed. 1948). Jay argued that treaty-making called for expertise, experience,
independent judgment, and stability. Because of these requirements, the Constitution
wisely gave the treaty power to the Senate, not to the House.
They who wish to commit the power under the consideration [the treaty
power] to a popular assembly [i.e., the House of Representatives], composed
of members constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to
recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment
of those great objects, which require to be steadily contemplated in all their
relations and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved
by measures which not only talents, but also exact information, and often
much time, are necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore,
for the convention [the Convention of 1787] to provide, not only that the
power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men,
but also that they should continue in place of a sufficient time to become
perfectly acquainted with out national concerns, and to form and introduce
a system for the management of time. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
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which are laws of the United States, binding on the national and
state governments and all United States citizens. Treaties are decisions
of the United States Government and are as authoritative as acts of
Congress. Moreover, treaties do not need the approval of the House.
They are federal legislation by other means. If the approval of the
House were required, the Framers' careful republican plans would
have come to nothing.
Chief Justice John Marshall authored the first Supreme Court
decision recognizing this principle. The case, United States v. The
Schooner Peggy,9 arose during the undeclared naval war with France.
Congress enacted a statute providing that if a duly commissioned
91 United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). The
detailed facts of the case are as follows. The French were allies of colonial America
during the Revolution, and for many years they were loved by many United States
citizens, particularly those on the political left. During John Adams' Administration,
however, the French, angered over John Jay's treaty with Great Britain, Treaty of
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, 8
Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, became hostile and demanding in their dealings with the
United States. French hostility prompted the New Republic, led by the Federalists,
to prepare for war. These preparations produced the Alien and Sedition Acts, Act
of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, see I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE
CONSTITUTION 460-71 (1950), and a statute authorizing the President to commission
privateers to seize French vessels on the high seas, Act of July 19, 1798, ch. 68, 1
Stat. 578. The statute stated that any French vessel captured by a duly commissioned
privateer would be forfeited and, "on due condemnation," distributed to the owners,
officers, and crew of the privateer. Id. § 5, 1 Stat. 579. In April of 1800, in reliance
upon this statute, encouraged no doubt by patriotic sentiment as well as by the
prospect of private gain, the officers and men of the United States ship Trumbull
fell upon a French ship, the schooner Peggy, ran her to ground near Port au Prince,
brought her to the State of Connecticut, and obtained a judgment of condemnation
against her in the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut. The Schooner Peggy,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 103-06. The court directed both ship and cargo to be sold and
divided, under the statute, between the United States and the officers and men of
the Trumbull. Following this judgment, the owners of the Peggy appealed. Id. at
103.
Seven days after entry of judgment, while the appeal was pending, the United
States plenipotentiary in Paris, William Vans Murray, signed a convention with
France in which both nations agreed to terminate the undeclared war. Convention
of Friendship and Commerce, Sept. 30, 1800, United States-France, 8 Stat. 178,
T.S. No. 85. Article 4 of this Convention provided that all ships seized during the
hostilities but not yet "definitely condemned" should be restored to their owners.
Id. at art. IV. The Convention was ratified by the President with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate during the following year. Thus, when the case
of the schooner Peggy came before the Supreme Court on writ of error, the issue
concerned the legal effect of the Convention. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 108.
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privateer of the United States captured a French vessel, a court of
the United States could condemn the captured vessel and distribute
the ship and cargo to the crew of the privateer. Following one such
condemnation and distribution, the French owners appealed. While
the appeal was pending, the United States and France signed the
Convention of 1800 officially ending the hostilities. The Convention
provided that all ships seized during the hostilities, but not officially
condemned, should be returned to their owners.
The case reached the Supreme Court following ratification of the
Convention. Marshall's opinion noted simply that the Constitution
declared treaties to be laws of the land.92 As such, they were binding
upon executive and judicial officers of the United States. During the
pendency of the appeal, the Peggy's fate had remained in controversy.
She had not yet been "definitively condemned." Therefore, as the
Convention provided, she had to be restored to her owners. Under
the law of the land as it then stood, the judgment of condemnation
could not be sustained. 93
Whether the House of Representatives would have agreed to the
terms of the Convention of 1800 is a question that history does not
answer. The approval of the House was simply not required. Even
in the face of a valid congressional enactment to the contrary, 94 the
Convention of 1800, ratified by the President with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, was fully effective as the law
of the United States in accordance with the Framers' design. Nu-
merous subsequent decisions have recognized the underlying princi-
ple. 95
In discussing the legal effect of treaties under the Constitution,
learned writers sometimes refer to two categories of treaties: "self-
executing" treaties and "nonself-executing" treaties.9" "Self-executing"
treaties require no further legislative action to secure their imple-
mentation by executive officers. "Nonself-executing" treaties require
implementing legislation, usually in the form of an act of Congress.
92 The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 109.
91 Id. at 109-10.
- See Act of July 19, 1798, ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578.
91 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Thomas v. Gay, 169
U.S. 264 (1898); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896); Boudinot v. United
States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829).
916 See L. HENKIN, supra note 59, at 156-62.
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This traditional nom mclature is useful, but it must be used with care.
Treaties are laws of tae United States and must be enforced in
accordance with their terms. If a treaty provides that it will not be
fully effective absent implementing legislation, it must be given effect
in accordance with its terms. Conversely, if a treaty purports to be
self-executing, it will be fully effective upon ratification of the con-
tracting parties. 97 The contracting parties, as a matter of strategy,
discretion, or convenience, may determine which form the treaty will
take. The President and Senate may elect to make a treaty that will
depend for its operation upon legislation enacted by Congress in the
same way Congress may elect to enact a statute that will depend for
its operation on administrative rules to be promulgated under the
statute. The decision to draft, approve, and ratify a "nonself-exe-
cuting" treaty can be seen as a delegation of authority by the President
and Senate to Congress. The constitutionality of this delegation has
never been questioned.
3. Scope of the Treaty Power
The treaty-making power is unlike any other legislative power
created by the Constitution. The political realities of 1787 explain its
unique position. As noted earlier, the Framers looked upon themselves
as citizens of thirteen separate states. Although they wanted to
strengthen the national government, they did not want to abolish the
states or curtail the general governmental functions of the states.
Their task was to identify the specific powers necessary for the
11 Professor Henkin asserts that "[n]ot all treaties . . . are in fact law of the
land of their own accord." Id. at 157. This statement illustrates the problem.
Professor Henkin's point is that some treaties do not create rules of decision for
the courts, absent implementing legislation. In support of this proposition he cites
Chief Justice Marshall's language in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314
(1829): "But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of
the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court." At the risk of making too much of a
small point, we note that Chief Justice Marshall's language does not support Professor
Henkin's assertion. Marshall said that a non self-executing treaty was not a "rule
for the Court." He did not say that it was not a "law." With deference to Professor
Henkin, a non self-executing treaty, addressing itself to the political branches, is as
much a "law" of the United States as, for example, the Guaranty Clause of the
Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, which is not a rule for the Court; or
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982), which would
have little or no force in the judicial branch absent implementation by administrative
rule.
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national government and to preserve all other powers for the states.
Given this political imperative, they produced a document that specified
various federal legislative powers by subject matter and confined
federal legislative authority to these subjects. As a result, the Con-
stitution created a national government with limited legislative powers
in the domestic field and preserved the general legislative authority
for the states. 98
But in the field of foreign affairs the Framers organized legislative
power in a fundamentally different way. Within this field the states
were to have no authority, and the national government was to be
preeminent. 99 Accordingly, the Framers conferred the treaty power
upon the President and the Senate in general terms. They did not
specify the subjects to which the treaty power would extend, because
the power would extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between
our nation and others.' ° Thus, the treaty power is unique in that it
is the only plenary legislative power belonging to the national gov-
98 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Congressman John Calhoun recognized this point as early as 1816:
The limits of [domestic legislative authority] are exactly marked; it was
necessary to prevent collision with similar co-existing state powers. This
country is divided into many distinct sovereignties. Exact enumeration here
is necessary to prevent the most dangerous consequences. Tne enumeration
of legislative power in the Constitution has relation, then, not to the treaty
power, but to the powers of the States. In our relation to the rest of the
world the case is reversed. Here the States disappear. Divided within, we
present the exterior of undivided sovereignty .... Whatever, then, concerns
our foreign relations; whatever requires the consent of another nation,
belongs to the treaty power; can only be regulated by it; and it is competent
to regulate all such subjects; provided, and here are its true limits, such
regulations are not inconsistent with the Constitution. 29 ANNALS OF CONG.
530-31 (1816) (emphasis added).
, Justice Field drafted the classic statement of the rule:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the
nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be
contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one
of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter,
without its consent .... But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that
there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any
matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889) (emphasis added). See also Asakura v.
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); In re
Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891).
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ernment which is subject to no express or implied limitations arising
from the reserved legislative powers of the several states.
Although the federal government has plenary treaty-making power,
it may not enact a treaty that violates the Constitution. Reid v.
Covert' illustrates the point. A military court of the United States
tried and convicted a woman of the murder of her husband, a ser-
viceman stationed in Great Britain. The woman, a civilian, claimed
a constitutional right to be tried in a court of law and challenged the
jurisdiction of the military court on that basis. 0 2 In support of the
conviction, the government argued that the military trial, under the
Code of Military Justice, was a necessary and proper means of
implementing a status of forces agreement between the United States
and Great Britain. This agreement provided that the United States
military courts would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committed in Great Britain by United States servicemen and their
dependents. 10 The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument
and upheld the constitutional right of a civilian to be tried in a court
of law. In holding that no treaty or other international agreement
could authorize what the Constitution forbids, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to
apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot
be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate
combined [under the treaty clause]."' 1
Therefore, while a treaty can deal with proper subjects of nego-
tiation, it cannot repeal the first amendment, deny a state a republican
form of government, 105 or deprive a United States citizen of liberty
without due process of law. °6 Similarly, because the Constitution
provides that "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives,"' 1 7 a treaty cannot lay a tax, nor authorize an
expenditure of money from the treasury. 108 The important point to
remember is that the constitutional limitations on the treaty power
are not specific to the treaty power. The limitations apply to all
branches of the national government including the President and
,o Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
02 Id. at 4.
,03 Id. at 16, 20.
,04 Id. at 17.
105 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
,o6 See id. at amend. V.
107 Id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
108 Id. § 9, cf. 7.
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Congress, as well as the President and Senate acting together under
the treaty clause. If the Constitution limits the treaty power, it limits
the authority of the government generally.
Some critics have argued that the Constitution imposes implicit
limitations on the treaty power. In the manual he prepared for his own
use as President of the Senate during John Adams' Administration, 109
Thomas Jefferson suggested that the treaty power might be subject
to special limitations implicit in the constitutional fabric." 0 He rea-
soned that the scope of the treaty power might be limited by the
specific grants of legislative authority to Congress. For example, since
article I, section 8, gives Congress power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, the Constitution might implicitly preclude the Pres-
ident and Senate from legislating on that subject under the treaty
clause. Under Jefferson's view the President, with the consent of the
Senate, could negotiate a treaty dealing with foreign commerce, but
such a treaty could not operate as a final, authoritative act of the
United States Government absent implementing legislation. According
to this theory, a treaty dealing with a matter within the legislative
competence of Congress could not be "self-executing."" '
Mr. Jefferson did not attend the Convention of 1787 and thus did
not participate in the debates concerning the treaty clause. He was
far more democratic than most of the political leaders of his day.
He was the leader of a political party that favored popular democracy
and opposed the policies of the Federalists, who controlled the Pres-
idency and the Senate during the early years of the Republic. More-
over, he wrote his manual in 1797 and 1798, at the height of the
bitter controversy between the Anti-Federalists and the Federalists,
on the eve of the undeclared naval war with France. Jefferson's
implicit limitation proposal, however, did not persuade Chief Justice
Marshall who had the last word on the treaty issue. As noted above,
Marshall's view was that the President and Senate could make treaties
109 T. JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE (1801).
11o Id. at 110.
"I Mr. Jefferson observed that the question of the scope of the treaty power was
one as to which there was no general agreement. He carefully noted that there was
a difference of opinion as to the specific question under discussion here. Some of
his colleagues thought that the treaty power did not extend to subjects of legislation
in which the Constitution "gave a participation to the House of Representatives."
Id. Others denied this exception "on the ground that it would leave very little matter
for the treaty power to work on." Id.
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that were fully effective as law, even when such treaties dealt with
subjects within the legislative competence of Congress. 12
John Marshall's judgment was both binding and correct. In the
domestic field the powers of Congress are so extensive that virtually
no subject is beyond its competence. Therefore, as Jefferson himself
conceded, if these broad legislative powers implicitly limited the treaty
power, the treaty power would become little more than a tool of
negotiation, with the power of ratification residing ultimately in
Congress in almost every case. The President and Senate acting alone
would have almost no power to make treaties that would be fully
operative as law. This result would be inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the constitutional text and with the logic of the Framers'
decision to exclude the House from the treaty-making process. The
Framers wanted to put the treaty power in the hands of the President
and the Senate."1 3 If the effectiveness of a treaty depended on the
approval of the House, the Framer's plan would be defeated.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PANAMA CANAL
Following extended negotiations during four presidencies, negoti-
ators for the United States concluded that our nation could strengthen
its position in the Caribbean by changing the basic arrangement
established by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. The old ar-
rangement had become a liability. A new arrangement could eliminate
the controversial American Zone and still protect United States in-
terests. Notwithstanding the absence of an American Zone, United
States military presence in the Caribbean, coupled with a neutrality
arrangement for the Canal, would continue to protect United States
strategic and commercial interests in Panama. Considering these fac-
tors, it made sense to dismantle the Zone and transfer the Canal to
Panama.
But the negotiators had no authority to bind the United States.
Thus, as the negotiation neared a conclusion, they faced a basic
constitutional question: who, within the United States Government,
had the power to authorize a transfer of the Canal to Panama? In
the following paragraphs we will discuss that question, explain its
significance, and describe how the Carter Administration ultimately
resolved it.
'1 See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
, See supra text accompanying notes 68-90.
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A. The Power to Decide
1. Possibilities
The power to transfer the Canal to Panama lay somewhere within
the federal government. How was it to be exercised? In theory, three
possibilities existed. First, acting under article IV, section 3 of the
Constitution, Congress might pass a statute dismantling the Zone and
transferring the Canal to Panama. 1 14 Second, the President and two-
thirds of the Senate, acting under the treaty clause, might conclude
a nonself-executing treaty with Panama contemplating a transfer but
requiring congressional action to complete the transfer." 5 Finally, the
President and two-thirds of the Senate might conclude a self-executing
treaty dismantling the Zone and disposing of the Canal without an
act of Congress, if they had power to do so under the Constitution.
In the summer of 1977, the Carter Administration had to decide
which of these three courses to pursue.
2. Political Dimensions of the Choice
From a political standpoint important differences existed among
these three procedures. A statute authorizing the President to transfer
the Canal to Panama would require the approval of a majority of
both houses (51 votes in the Senate and 218 votes in the House). A
nonself-executing treaty would require the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate (67 votes). In addition, implementing legislation authorizing
the transfer under the nonself-executing treaty would require majority
approval by both houses. Finally, a self-executing treaty would require
only the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Thus, from the Admin-
istration's standpoint, the nonself-executing treaty, requiring imple-
menting legislation, was the most demanding and least attractive of
the three procedures. As between the other two, the trade-off was
intriguing. A statute would require the approval of a simple majority
in both houses; a self-executing treaty would require the approval of
an extraordinary majority in the Senate, but no votes in the House.
Where did the advantage lie?
In the summer of 1977, the political calculation was much the same
as it had been in the summer of 1787. United States citizens would
oppose any proposal to transfer the Canal to Panama." 6 The House
114 See supra note 59.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
,,6 See supra note 3.
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of Representatives was close to the people, and if the proposal were
submitted to the House, the members would be forced to vote on it
in an election year. The chance of a favorable vote in the House was
very small indeed.11 7 In contrast, the Senate was a peculiar institution,
in which two-thirds of the members were always at least three to
four years away from the next election. The Senate, like the House,
was attentive to public opinion, but senators took pride in their
detachment, their judgment, and their expertise in the field of foreign
affairs. In the case of the Panama Canal, the clear political choice
was to find sixteen additional votes in the Senate and thereby avoid
submitting the proposal to the House in an election year. The only
question was whether the Constitution permitted the President and
Senate to dispose of the Canal by treaty, without House approval.
In July, 1977, prior to the conclusion of the negotiation and the
announcement of any proposal concerning the Canal, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance requested the opinion of the Attorney General on
this issue. 118
3. The Opinion-Giving Function of the Attorney General
The most important administrative duty expressly described in the
Constitution is the President's duty to take care that the laws of the
land are faithfully executed." 9 The clearest implication of this duty
is that the President must often decide legal questions. Although the
President is responsible for deciding momentous policy questions, he
must do so within the framework established by law. Consequently,
before the President can formulate policy on any matter, he must
decide what the law requires and what it permits. 2
0
The President's comprehensive responsibility for both law and pol-
icy creates a difficult problem for the executive branch. The courts
are concerned almost solely with law. Congress is concerned primarily
with policy. The Executive must be concerned with law and policy
without allowing its duty to the one to detract from its duty to the
other. How the Executive deals with this dilemma is the most impor-
tant single measure of its performance in a government under law.
In an effort to assist the President in deciding legal questions,
Congress created the office of the Attorney General in the Judiciary
. See supra note 7.
See 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 18 (1977).
"9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
120 The President swears to follow the laws of the land when he takes the oath
of office. Id. at § 1, cl. 7.
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Act of 1789.121 In the beginning the Attorney General had no ad-
ministrative responsibilities, and although he was a member of the
President's cabinet, he had no official policy-making function. Under
the statute the Attorney General's primary responsibility was to advise
the President and the heads of the departments on questions of law.
22
Although the office has changed greatly over the years, the Attorney
General is still charged with the duty of advising the executive branch
on legal questions.
Different conceptions exist concerning the advice-giving function
of the Attorney General. Some have argued that the Attorney General
is simply a lawyer who gives legal advice in confidence and then
defends the administration's position in the same way that a private
lawyer advises and defends his clients.1 23 Others have argued that the
Attorney General should exercise independent judgment on legal ques-
tions. 124 The second view is the better one by far. It serves the true
interests of the Executive in a government under law. Of all the
cabinet members, the Attorney General is the one who is least con-
cerned with policy and most concerned with law. He is therefore the
one in the best position to provide the Executive with legal advice
unclouded by policy concerns. In the performance of his constitutional
duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, the President is well
served by an Attorney General who remains aloof from politics and
renders independent opinions on legal questions which the President
may then accept or reject. Questions such as the one raised by the
Secretary of State concerning the disposition of the Panama Canal
should be considered and resolved by the Attorney General in that
light.
4. The Merits of the Question
When the Panama question arose in July, 1977, the Supreme Court
had not yet decided whether the President and Senate had the au-
thority to make a self-executing treaty transferring to a foreign power
121 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
22 Id. The best history of the office of the Attorney General is H. CUMMINGS &
C. McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937).
123 See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS 95TH CONG., 2D
SEss., THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO DISPOSE OF
UNITED STATES PROPERTY 38 (Comm. Print 1978) (statement of Professor Raoul
Berger).
24 Cf. I Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228 (1977) (opinion concerning independence of
Solicitor General).
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a possession as large and as valuable as the Panama Canal. Thus,
there was no short or easy answer to the Secretary of State's question.
The absence of definitive precedent meant that the Attorney General's
opinion would turn upon general constitutional principles and his
reading of the relevant historical materials.
As noted above, the basic constitutional principle governing the
treaty-making power is that a self-executing treaty becomes fully
effective as law upon ratification, notwithstanding the absence of
approval of the House of Representatives. Moreover, the treaty power
extends to all proper subjects for negotiation between our nation and
others, 125 subject to the rule in Reid v. Covert that the President and
Senate may not, by treaty, do anything prohibited by the Consti-
tution. 126 The disposition of the Panama Canal was obviously a proper
subject for negotiation between our nation and the Republic of Pan-
ama. Therefore, the President and Senate had the authority to dipose
of the Canal by treaty, unless the Constitution prohibited them from
doing so. Because the Constitution did not expressly forbid a dis-
position by treaty, only an implied prohibition could have prevented
the transfer of the Canal.
The most powerful argument to be made in support of an implied
prohibition was the Jeffersonian argument. Article IV, section 3 of
the Constitution expressly gave Congress power to "dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States.' ' 27 If the President and the
Senate could use the treaty power to dispose of territory or property
belonging to the United States, they could subvert the authority of
the House under article IV. Therefore, article IV should be read to
exclude the treaty power by implication.'12
But the Jeffersonian argument proved too much. The Constitution
expressly gave numerous powers to Congress. If these express powers
implicitly limited the treaty power, the treaty clause would become
a dead letter. As a general proposition, express congressional powers
did not limit the treaty power by implication. Thus, the decisive issue
was whether the power of disposition differed from other congres-
sional powers in this respect. The Attorney General reviewed the
authorities and found no basis for a distinction. All relevant materials
25 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
126 Id.
27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
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suggested that the President and Senate had authority to dispose of
territory or property under the treaty clause.
a. History
The records of the Convention of 1787 indicated that the Framers
actually discussed the issue whether the treaty power could be used
to dispose of the territory or property of the United States. Various
delegates in the Convention argued that the treaty power might be
used to cede territory or property to foreign nations. '29 In con-
sidering whether the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate should
be required in the making of treaties, Hugh Williamson and Richard
Dobbs Spaight moved that no treaty of peace affecting "territorial
rights" should be made without the concurrence of two-thirds
of the Senate.'3 ° The delegates eventually decided to require the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate in the making of all treaties.
Because the delegates recognized the property disposition issue and
rejected specific proposals to require the concurrence of the House
in the making of treaties,' 31 they probably understood that the treaty
power could be used to cede territory or property without the approval
of the House.
Furthermore, nothing in the drafting history of article IV, section
3, supported a contrary view. The Framers drafted the territory and
property clause to deal with the problem of settling the conflicting
claims of various states to the unsettled western lands the United
States acquired as a result of the Treaty of Paris. 3 2 The Framers
wanted to assure that the Constitution would not prejudice these
claims and that Congress would have power to deal with the claims
following adoption of the Constitution. Thus, the territory and prop-
erty clause stated in its entirety, that: "Congress shall have power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or property belonging to the United States, and nothing
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice the claims
of the United States, or of any particular State."'' The words in
129 See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
72, at 297 (Mason: the Senate could "sell the whole Country by means of Treaties");
id. at 297-98 (Mason: "Senate by means of treaty might alienate territory, etc.
without legislative sanction .... [Tlhe Senate might by treaty dismember the Union").
ISo Id. at 543.
13, See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
32 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 72, at
392.
,' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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italics referred to claims concerning the western lands. Therefore, the
record of the Framers' deliberations on this subject did not suggest
that the purpose or the effect of this clause was to preclude self-
executing treaties disposing of territory or property belonging to the
United States.
Finally, the issue concerning the disposition of territory through
the treaty power surfaced in debates over the Constitution in the
state ratifying conventions of 1788 and 1789. Some opponents of the
Constitution feared that the treaty power could be used to compromise
territorial claims to the detriment of particular states, primarily those
interested in the free navigation of the Mississippi River. The Virginia
and North Carolina ratifying conventions proposed amendments to
the Constitution requiring that every treaty ceding or compromising
rights or claims of United States territory be approved by three-fourths
of the members of both houses of Congress. 34 These proposals in-
dicated that the Framers were aware of the relationship between the
treaty clause and the disposition of territory or property belonging
to the United States.
b. Judicial Decisions
Although the Supreme Court had never directly addressed the
property disposition issue as it was presented in the Panama Canal
case, the Court had decided a number of cases involving Indian treaties
which did lend support to the view that the power of disposition could
be exercised by the President and Senate under the treaty clause.'35
For most of the 19th century, the federal government treated the Indian
tribes as foreign nations, dealing with the tribes by treaty.'36 Under
these treaties questions sometimes arose concerning property rights.
1 The North Carolina ratifying convention proposed the following provision:
[N]o treaty, ceding, contracting, or restraining or suspending the territorial
rights or claims of the United States, . . . shall be made, but in cases of
the most urgent and extreme necessity, nor shall any treaty be ratified
without the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the
members of both houses respectively.
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
271 (1894). This proposal also was offered by the Virginia ratifying convention. Id.
at 382. See generally S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
220-21 (2d ed. 1916).
"I See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233, 238 (1906); Jones v. Meehan, 175
U.S. 1 (1899); Best v. Polk, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 112 (1873); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 211 (1872); United States v. Brooks, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 442 (1850).
136 This practice came to an abrupt halt in 1871 when Congress declared that
henceforth no Indian tribe would be recognized as an independent nation "with
whom the United States may contract by treaty." Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, §
1, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
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In general, the United States claimed Indian territory by right of con-
quest, subject to the Indians' right to occupy and use the land. Thus,
according to common law principles, the United States held legal title
to the land, subject to an equitable Indian title. Occasionally a tribe
would cede its equitable right to the United States by treaty, while
reserving certain territory for its continued use and enjoyment, thereby
creating an Indian "reservation." The legal issue that arose in such
a case was whether the tribe retained only an equitable title to the
reservation or whether it acquired full legal title to the reservation
as a result of the treaty. The Court held uniformly that the transac-
tion conveyed full legal title to the tribe. Because the treaty conveyed
the title, an act of Congress was not required.' 37
The Indian treaty cases obviously involved a special situation.
Moreover, there was an important practical difference between the
creation of an Indian reservation within the boundaries of the United
States and an actual cession of territory or property of the United
States to a foreign power. On the other hand, the Indian treaty cases
were consistent with the theory of concurrent power. While Congress
had power to convey property to the Indians by statute, the Indian
treaty cases held that the President and Senate had similar power
under the treaty clause.
c. Treaty Practice
Finally, the historical treaty practice of the United States suggested
that the President and Senate had the power to transfer territory or
property to foreign nations by treaty. It was a mixed practice, to be
sure. In some situations the President and Senate disposed of territory
or compromised territorial claims by self-executing treaty. 3 ' At other
times the President and Senate made treaties that required imple-
,3' See cases cited in supra note 135.
The disposition of territory or property is a natural subject for negotiation
between nations. It is not surprising that some of the most famous treaties in the
history of the United States have involved territory or territorial claims, and some
of these have, of their own force, compromised territorial claims or disposed of
territory or property belonging to the United States. See, e.g., Treaty of Amity,
Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, United States - Spain, 8 Stat..252, T.S. No.
327 (whereby the United States acquired Florida and ceded Texas to Spain); Treaty
to Settle and Define Boundaries, Aug. 9, 1842, United States - Great Britain, 8
Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119 (Webster-Ashburton Treaty); Treaty in Regard to Limits
Westward of the Rocky Mountains, June 15, 1846, United States - Great Britain,
9 Stat. 869, T.S. No. 120 (Oregon Treaty).
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menting legislation authorizing the disposition. 13 9 Occasionally Con-
gress had acted alone, without a treaty, to authorize a disposition
of territory or property.' 40 Taken as a whole, the treaty practice was
consistent with the proposition that the power of disposition did not
reside exclusively in one authority but was possessed by the legislative
and executive branches concurrently.
5. The Administration's Decision and the Resulting
Controversy
The Constitution and the relevant historical and judicial materials
suggested that the President and Senate had power to transfer the
Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama by self-executing treaty,
without the approval of the House of Representatives. The Consti-
tution did not require the President and Senate to use this procedure,
but it permitted them to do so. The Carter Administration took this
view in the summer of 1977,' ' and when the negotiators concluded
their work, the final draft of the Treaty purported to be self-executing
as to the basic question. The Treaty provided that the United States
would dismantle the Canal Zone within six months following the
exchange of the ratification instruments, and that the United States
would transfer the Canal and its appurtenant facilities to Panama in
the year 2000 without congressional approval.' 42 The Administration
had chosen to cast its lot with the Senate and to exclude the House
from the decision. In effect, the Administration was gambling that
the Framers were correct and that two-thirds of the Senate possessed,
in this instance, wisdom and detachment that would be inaccessible
to Congress as a whole.
"I One such treaty involved the Canal Zone. See Treaty of Mutual Understanding
and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, United States - Panama, art. V, 6 U.S.T. 2273,
2278, T.I.A.S. No. 3297.
,40 Absent treaty authorization, numerous statutes and joint resolutions have au-
thorized the sale or transfer of various kinds of property to foreign powers. In
recent years the sale or transfer of military equipment has proceeded largely upon
this basis. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-68 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). On occasion Congress
has authorized the transfer of real estate. Some of these transactions have involved
Panama. See, e.g., Joint Resolution of May 3, 1943, ch. 92, 57 Stat. 74.
,41 See 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 18 (1977).
142 Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States - Panama, arts. I, II, IX,
__ U.S.T. .. T.I.A.S. No. 10,030, at 1, 10, 11-12, 23-37. As noted, President
Carter's entire proposal was contained in two treaties, see supra note 3. The Panama
Canal Neutrality and Operation Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States - Panama,
__ U.S.T. .. T.I.A.S. No. 10,029, concerned the neutrality of the Canal. The
Panama Canal Treaty dismantled the Canal Zone and authorized the transfer of
the Canal in the year 2000.
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The basic question presented by the proposed treaty was one of
policy: was it wise to dismantle the Canal Zone and transfer the
Canal to Panama? But the legal question quickly became an important
issue in the general debate. The opponents of the treaty, relying upon
article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, argued that the disposition
could occur only pursuant to an act of Congress.'43 Supporters of
the Treaty argued that the approval of the President and two-thirds
of the Senate would suffice. The appropriate committees in both
houses of Congress held hearings to consider the issue. 144 The witnesses
at these hearings, some of them distinguished constitutional author-
ities, expressed a wide range of views on the merits.' 45
The arguments opposing the Administration's position included
those outlined above: (1) the express grant of power to Congress
under article IV, section 3, implicitly limited the treaty power; 46 and
(2) the issue was debatable in any event, since no definitive judicial
141 See, e.g., Hatch, Panama Canal Giveaway Violates Constitution, in SENATE
SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE PROPOSED PANAMA
CANAL TREATIES: A DIGEST OF INFORMATION 257 (Comm. Print 1978).
I" See The Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent
Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, Signed on Behalf of the United
States at the Headquarters of the Organization of American States on Sept. 7, 1977:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); Panama Canal Treaty (Disposition of United States Territory): Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Power of Congress to Dispose of U.S.
Property: Hearings Before the Panama Canal Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Canal Operation Under
1977 Treaty: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on the Panama Canal of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
"I See, e.g., The Relationship Between the Treaty Power and the Power of Congress
to Dispose of U.S. Territory and Property Under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2
of the Constitution; and the Relationship Between the Treaty Power and the Power
of Congress to Make Appropriations Under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 129 (1978) (testimony of Professor Raoul Berger to the effect that Congress
alone had power to dispose of the Canal); id. at 157 (testimony of Professor Charles
Rice to the same effect); id. at 175 (testimony and statement of Professor Scot Powe
expressing some doubt on the point). See also STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PANAMA CANAL TREATIES [UNITED
STATES SENATE DEBATE] 1977-78, 811-15 (Comm. Print 1978) (testimony of Professor
John N. Moore to the effect that the President and Senate had power to transfer
the Canal under the treaty clause); id. at 815-20 (testimony of Professor Covey
Oliver to the same effect).
,46 See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 95TH CONG.,
2D SESS., THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO DISPOSE
OF UNITED STATES PROPERTY 11-29 (Comm. Print 1978).
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decision existed on the subject. 47 Moreover, those in opposition to
the Treaty argued that the Administration's legal position simply
could not be trusted. 148 The reasoning behind this third argument
was that legal representatives of the executive branch were merely
attorneys for a client, providing a defense for a position taken for
reasons of policy; 149 therefore, it was doubtful whether these repre-
sentatives had considered the issue carefully. 50 This was the argument
ad hominem, which is usually a sign of a weak case. Cicero explained
the strategy over two thousand years ago: if the law is on your side,
argue the law; if the facts are on your side, argue the facts; if neither
the law nor the facts are on your side, attack the opposing attorney. 5'
6. The Resolution of the Controversy
The President's decision to submit a self-executing treaty to the
Senate resolved the property disposition issue insofar as the executive
branch was concerned. Predictably, however, the opponents of the
Treaty instituted litigation to disrupt the ratification process and to
seek review of the Executive's internal decision. In Edwards v. Carter, 15 2
various members of the House of Representatives challenged the
Treaty on the ground that they, as members of the House, had a
constitutional right to vote on the question of the disposition of the
Panama Canal. They asserted that the President and Senate were
attempting to deprive them of this right by making a treaty that
would dispose of the Canal without House approval."' The District
Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, holding
that the congressmen lacked "standing to sue."'15 4 On the ensuing
147 See The Relationship Between the Treaty Power and the Power of Congress
to Dispose of U.S. Territory and Property Under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2
of the Constitution; and the Relationship between the Treaty Power and the Power
of Congress to make Appropriations Under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 171-91 (1978).
.48 STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO DISPOSE OF UNITED
STATES PROPERTY 7 (Comm. Print 1978).
,49 Id. at 38 (statement of Professor Raoul Berger).
150 Id. at 7.
- See Cicero, De Oratore, in ON ORATORY AND ORATORS 170 (J. Watson ed. &
trans. 1970).
52 Edwards v. Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1055
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
"I Id. at 1280.
114 See.Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided the case on the merits.' 55 In a decision handed down only a
few days before the Senate vote on ratification, the court of appeals
upheld the Administration's position by a two-to-one vote.5 6
The per curiam opinion, in which Judges Fahy and McGowan
joined, reviewed the relevant authorities and concluded that the power
of disposition, although expressly given to Congress in article IV,
also was given to the President and Senate under the treaty clause.
In a forceful dissent, Judge McKinnon argued that the House of
Representatives should be consulted in a matter as important as the
disposition of the Panama Canal.'57 George Mason, Gouverneur Mor-
ris, John Francis Mercer, and James Wilson would have agreed with
Judge McKinnon, 58 but for better or worse they lost that argument
two centuries ago. The disappointed plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari.
The Supreme Court denied this petition on May 15, 1978.1 9
7. The Decisive Vote and the Aftermath
On April 18, 1978, shortly after the decision of the court of appeals,
the Senate voted on ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. The
outcome was by no means certain.160 The opposition needed only
thirty-four votes to defeat the Treaty, and as John Hay had said,
one third of the Senate would vote against the Sermon on the Mount.' 6'
Fifty to sixty senators openly supported the treaty, but the swing
votes, numbers sixty to sixty-seven, remained in doubt.
To strengthen its position with some of the undecided senators, the
Administration had agreed to accept certain reservations to the
-" Id. at 1064.
156 Id.
"I Id. at 1064-1103.
,58 See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
159 Edwards v. Carter, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
,60 The New York Times reported that the outcome was in doubt up to the final
vote. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1978, at Al, col. 6.
16, No Secretary of State before or since has entertained a lower opinion of the
Senate. Here are a few of the things John Hay said about the Senate: "[T]here will
always be 34% of the Senate on the blackguard side of every question that comes
before them." 2 W. THAYER, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN HAY 254 (1915).
"[N]o treaty on which discussion was possible, no treaty that gave room for a
difference of opinion, could ever pass the Senate." Id. at 273. "A treaty entering
the Senate is like a bull going into an arena: no one can say just how or when the
final blow will fall-but one thing is certain-it will never leave the arena alive."
Id. at 393.
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Treaty, 162 but the Administration had held firm on the basic pro-
cedural point. As proposed to the Senate, the Treaty would dismantle
the Canal Zone and transfer the Canal to Panama in accordance
with the schedule contained therein, without further legislative action.
Thus, the senators had a clear and final choice to make. Although
they had made other difficult choices since the conclusion of the war
in Southeast Asia, none had been more problematical from a political
standpoint, and none had called more clearly for the exercise of the
peculiar senatorial virtues in which the Framers had placed their
hopes. The roll call vote came late in the afternoon: sixty-eight
senators for ratification, thirty-two against.163 President Carter signed
the instrument of ratification two months later, on June 15, 1978,164
and the Treaty entered into force on October 1, 1979.
The Panama Canal Treaty was not self-executing in all respects.
It provided for a gradual transition from United States to Panamanian
control over a twenty-one year period. During that period the United
States would retain administrative responsibility for the Canal. 65 The
United States would control the Canal through a new agency of the
United States Government, the Panama Canal Commission. 166 The
Treaty, however, did not create this Commission. Moreover, admin-
istration of the Canal over the next two decades would require
numerous governmental decisions, many of which could not or should
not be taken except pursuant to statute. 167 Therefore, to enable the
United States to control the Canal during the transitional period, the
Administration sought implementing legislation from Congress.
But the Administration had gambled and won. The ratified Treaty,
self-executing as to the question of disposition, presented the House
with a fait accompli. Most members were opposed to the "giveaway"
of the Canal, but the only question before them was whether the
House would preserve the advantages of the Treaty by enacting
legislation to manage the transition. 16 Because they recognized that
162 See 17 I.L.M. 820-22.
163 124 CONG. REC. 10,541 (1978).
164 17 I.L.M. 824-25.
65 Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, arts. II, III,
__ U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. 10,030.
66 Id. at art. III, 3.
167 See infra text accompanying notes 174-80.
166 The following colloquy between Congressmen Toby Roth, a Republican from
Wisconsin who opposed the implementing legislation, and Congressman David Bowen,
a courageous Democrat from Mississippi who reluctantly supported it, epitomized
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the Treaty would enter into force regardless of the implementing
legislation, many opponents of the Treaty were able to support the
implementing legislation on the theory that it preserved all possible
advantages for the United States. 169 Even so, the margin of approval
in the House was uncomfortably close. 170
the debate. Congressman Bowen's remark reflected the resignation of all those in
the House who realized that the basic policy decision already had been made:
Mr. Roth: The question is, you know we cannot put the onus on the
courts or on the Senate. The onus is here. We have our responsibility. As
I see it, our responsibility is to the American people.
I have heard so many speakers talk today and I have not heard one of
them ask yet what do the American people want. What do the people want
we are supposed to be representing. Mr. Bowen: I have asked my people
the same thing you have. When I get these little white cards in the mail
that say, "Dear Congressman: Please vote to keep our Panama Canal and
vote against the implementing legislation," I write them back and say,
"Thank you so much. I want to do both things. Unfortunately, I can do
but one. I will be very happy to vote against the implementing legislation
and give the Canal to Panama this year. Or I will vote for the implementing
legislation and keep the Canal until the end of the century. You just tell
me which one you would like to me to to," and I promise you, invariably
they say let us keep the Canal until the end of the century, no giveaway
in 1979.
125 CONG. REC. 15,764 (1979). Other participants in the debate readily acknowledged
that the only issue was whether Congress would enact legislation to manage the
transaction, not whether the Canal would be transferred. See 125 CONG. REc. 11,963
(1979) (remarks of Rep. Prichard); id. at 15,754 (remarks of Rep. Peyser); id.
(remarks of Rep. Fish); id. at 15,774 (remarks of Rep. Frenzel); id. at 15,781-82
(remarks of Rep. Boland); id. at 15,764-65 (remarks of Rep. Bauman); id. at 16,016
(remarks of Rep. Buchanan); id. at 26,328-29 (remarks of Rep. Derwinski); id. at
26,332-33 (remaks of Rep. Boquard); id. at 26,328 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield).
169 Among the opponents of the Treaty was John Murphy of New York, the
Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, who sponsored
bill H.R. 111 that eventually passed the House. See 125 CONG. REC. 15,756-57
(1979); id. at 26,326 (treaty "ill-conceived"). Other opponents voting for the im-
plementing legislation included Elliott Levitas, see id. at 16,014; David Bowen, see
id. at 15,762-64; John Dingell, see id. at 11,963-64; Dan Mica, see id. at 26,652-
53; Edward Derwinski, see id. at 15,998; Charles Pashayan, see id. at 16,022; Edwin
Bethune, see id. at 16,011-12; Bill Frenzel, see id. at 15,774-75; William Broomfield,
see id. at 26,328; John Buchanan, see id. at 16,016; Marilyn Bouquard, see id. at
26,332-33. Even the determined leader of the Republican resistance, Robert Bauman
of Maryland, tacitly endorsed the implementing legislation in the end and encouraged
his colleagues to vote for the legislation. Nothing more could be gained by expressing
opposition to a fait accompli, and legislation was needed to make the best of a bad
situation. 37 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2119 (Sept. 29, 1979).
170 There were several crucial votes in the troubled history of H.R. 111. The best
running tally and explanation of these votes can be found, of course, in the Congres-
sional Quarterly Weekly Report. An early indication that H.R. Ill was in trouble
came on the vote to approve the rule setting guidelines for debate. The rule passed
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The Framers believed that the exclusion of the House from the
treaty-making process would make a difference in the formulation
of United States foreign policy.'' The Framers, who were practical
politicians, would have found evidence to support their theory in the
events surrounding the making and the ratification of the Panama
Canal Treaty. The opponents of the Treaty pressed hard for House
participation in the basic policy decision, thinking the House would
derail the measure. 72 The supporters of the Treaty steadfastly resisted
these efforts and persuaded two-thirds of the Senate to vote for
ratification. The House narrowly approved the implementing legis-
lation, but only with the support Qf a hostile majority, who objected
to the situation in which the President, the Senate, and the Consti-
tution had placed them. 73 Considering the mood of the House, it
the House by a margin of only two votes (200 to 198). Most of the opposition
came from Republicans and Southern Democrats. See 37 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep.
990 (May 19, 1979). Thereafter, when the bill was under consideration in June, the
House leadership had to postpone at least one important vote after it became clear
that the bill might not survive. See 37 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1202 (June 16, 1979).
In late June the bill survived close votes on two killer amendments, one offered by
Representative Sonny Montgomery (213 votes against the amendment, 210 for), see
125 CONG. REc. 16,010-12 (1979), and one offered by Representative George Hansen,
(220 votes aginst the amendment, 200 for), see id. at 15,773. The defeat of the
Montgomery amendment by only three votes represented the strength of the op-
position at high water. H.R. Ill eventually passed the House by a 22-vote margin
on June 21, 1979. See id. at 16,022; see also 37 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1207-09
(June 23, 1979). The fight, however, was not over. The House conferees met with
their Senate counterparts and agreed to a conference report that softened some of
the tough provisions of the House bill, but the House then rejected the compromise
plan. See 125 CONG. REc. 25,551 (1979). Only in late September, after the leader
of the opposition conceded that implementing legislation was necessary in view of
the impending effective date of the Treaty, did the House approve the conference
report. Final approval came on September 26, 1979, only five days before the treaty
entered into force. See id. at 26,336; see also 37 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2119 (Sept.
29, 1979).
'7' See supra text accompanying note 90.
72 Two of the most responsible members of the House, Edward Derwinski and
Hamilton Fish, who supported the implementing legislation, admitted that if the
House had participated in the original Treaty decision, there might have been no
Treaty at all. 125 CONG. REC. 26,328-29 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Derwinski); id. at
15,574 (remarks of Rep. Fish).
"I H.R. 111 survived in the House by margins of 20, 3, and 22 votes. See supra
note 170. A change in position by as few as two or as many as 12 members would
have altered the outcome of these votes. If one can trust what the members actually
said about the issue, it is virtually certain that in each instance the swing votes came
from Republicans and Southern and Western Democrats who would not have ap-
proved the Treaty in the first instance, but who voted for the implementing legislation
because they believed that the President and the Senate had committed the nation,
and that there was no other responsible course to pursue. See supra notes 168-69.
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seems likely that the Treaty would have been rejected if the House
had participated in the basic decision.
B. The Constitution and the Transfer Mechanism
The influence of the Framers' design on the Panama Canal trans-
action did not end with ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty.
The Treaty provided for a continuing United States presence in Pan-
ama during the transition period, and the transfer mechanism pre-
sented interesting constitutional issues. The following paragraphs
discuss two of these issues.
1. The Canal and the Power of the Purse
The English king could demand the allegiance of his subjects, but
he was not entitled to take their property without their consent."'
The authority of the House of Commons over fiscal matters depended
on this principle. The Framers of the Constitution had the English
constitution in mind when they gave the House of Representa-
tives preeminent authority in all matters involving public fiscal policy."'
Two aspects of the Panama Canal transaction involved public
fiscal policy. First, under the Panama Canal Treaty, United States
administration of the Canal during the transition period involved
both the collection of revenue, primarily in the form of tolls, and
114 The idea that fundamental principles restricted the just authority of human
government originated thousands of years ago. In the early modern period, the
English came to believe that the limitations on the authority of their government
arose, not from the laws of God or nature, but from the customary arrangements
established by Englishmen to regulate their own affairs. Among these arrangements,
none was more important than the basic principle of public finance. Thus, if the
English King wished to tax the kingdom to raise funds for the treasury, he was
obliged to ask for his subjects' consent in advance. He did this by convoking
Parliament - which is to say, the House of Commons - where all free persons
of the realm were virtually, if not actually, represented. The consent of Parliament
was the consent of every person, and in matters involving property the consent of
every person was required.
The authority of the House of Commons in financial matters was a central principle
of English government long before the American Revolution, and during the 17th
century, it was one of the weapons in the arsenal of the parliamentary party.
A principle identified so closely with Parliament's victory over the Stewart kings
was sure to appeal to the Framers, who won a similar victory over George III.
Indeed, they carefully preserved the principle in their new Constitution by establishing
the House of Representatives as the United States analogue of the House of Com-
mons. See J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
70 (1955).
"I See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; id. § 9, cl. 7.
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the expenditure of funds to cover the costs of operating the Canal.
Second, the Treaty called for various payments to be made to the
Republic of Panama.176 The Treaty itself did not and could not
authorize these financial transactions. 77 Instead, the implementing
legislation that created the Panama Canal Commission,'78 and sub-
sequent congressional actions appropriating funds for the operation
and maintenance of the Canal, provided the necessary authorization. 179
Thus, the Treaty upheld the Framers' design by preserving the au-
thority of the House of Representatives over Canal revenues and
expenditures. 8 0
Some people argue that the power of the purse gives the House
of Representatives a financial veto over all governmental operations,
including those in the field of foreign affairs. This argument contains
an element of truth. Most governmental operations do involve taxing
or spending at some point. The financial veto, however, is an un-
reliable weapon. In each session of Congress, scores of representatives
vote to fund programs which they do not favor. They do this because
the programs already are in place, and because there is no other
practical or responsible course to pursue under the circumstances. In
general, there is an enormous political difference between voting to
commit the nation to a particular program or policy and voting to
fund the decision, once the commitment has been made. For this
reason, the power of the purse is not a political solvent that draws
76 Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States - Panama, art. 1II, 5, art.
XIII, 4, __ U.S.T. __ , T.I.A.S. No. 10,030 at 15, 39-40.
," One of the reservations attached by the Senate to the Treaty dealt with this
point: "(3) Notwithstanding any provision of the Treaty, no funds may be drawn
from the Treasury of the United States of America for payments under paragraph
4 of Article XIII without statutory authorization." United States Instrument of
Ratification with Reservations and Understanding to the Panama Canal Treaty, June
15, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 820, 821.
"I See 22 U.S.C. §§ 3711-31 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
,71 See, e.g., Panama Canal Commission Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-223,
99 Stat. 1738 (1986).
I'l It is worth noting that the question of the self-executing effect of the Panama
Canal Treaty on the revenues of the country has been debated in an interesting line
of tax cases in which United States employees of the Panama Canal Commission
have argued that article XV of the Agreement in Implementation of article III of
the Panama Canal Treaty, see U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10,031, at 1, 40,
exempts their earnings from taxation by the United States. See, e.g., Harris v. United
States, 768 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding taxpayers' claim), Swearingen v.
United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983) (denying taxpayers' claim on ground
that a treaty altering a revenue measure would be unconstitutional).
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all governmental authority ultimately to the House. The case of the
Panama Canal powerfully illustrates this point.
2. The Composition of the Panama Canal Commission
The second constitutional issue presented by the transfer mechanism
involved the composition of the Panama Canal Commission. The
Treaty expressly provided that the Commission would be an "agency"
of the United States,' that the Commission would operate the Canal
during the transition period, 8 2 and that a nine-member board ap-
pointed by the United States would govern the Commission.8 3 Five
of the board members would be nationals of the United States.
84
The other four would be nationals of Panama, selected by the Pan-
amanian Government for appointment by the United States.' 8 5 The
nationals of Panama would be removable either by Panama, or by
the United States with Panama's concurrence.
18 6
The Treaty also contained provisions dealing with the principal
executive officers of the Commission. It provided for an Adminis-
trator and a Deputy Administrator.'8 7 Initially, the Administrator
would be a national of the United States, and the Deputy Admin-
istrator would be a national of Panama. 18 8 Beginning in 1990, how-
ever, the Administrator would be a national of Panama and the
Deputy Administrator would be a national of the United States. 18 9
Finally, the Treaty contained numerous provisions governing the per-
sonnel practices of the Commission. These provisions called for the
establishment of a personnel system that would give preferential
treatment to Panamanians. Under the Treaty the people actually
running the Canal during the transition period would be Panamanians
to the greatest extent possible. 19 By participating in the management
of the Canal during the transition period, the Panamanians would
be in a position to assume full responsibility in the year 2000.
, Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, United States - Panama, art. III, 3,
U.S.T. __, T.I.A.S. No. 10,030, at 13-15.
I82 d. at 1, 3.
183 Id. at 3(a).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 3(b).
117 Id. at 3(c).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at art. III, 3(c), art. X.
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The administrative arrangement established by the Treaty was sen-
sible, but unique. The Treaty proposed that the governing board of
the Commission would include members nominated by a foreign
government; that the foreign government could request the removal
of these members; that the foreign government could eventually nom-
inate the principal administrative officer of the Commission; and that
the subordinate employees of the Commission would be foreign na-
tionals. No other United States agency was headed and staffed by
nominees of a foreign power. Was the Commission constitutional?
Article II of the Constitution contains the provisions that establish
the requirements for the internal organization of the executive branch.
It provides that the President shall nominate, and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, appoint ministers, consuls, judges, and
other "officers of the United States,"' 9 ' and that Congress may vest
the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 192 Beyond this, article
II has little to say concerning the officers of the United States. It
provides only that the President may require the written opinion of
the principal officer of each executive department upon any subject
relating to his duties,'93 and that the President, Vice-President, and
all civil officers of the United States "shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other
high crimes and misdemeanors.' ' 94
The President's power of appointment under article II is one of
the great instruments of his office. It permits him to establish his
administration and staff the government with people of his own
choosing. The Constitution implicitly forbids Congress or any other
authority to exercise or curtail the President's power of appointment.
Thus, Congress could not enact a statute requiring the President to
,' Article II, § 2, cl. 2 provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, Judges and the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Hands of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
192 Id.
"I Id. at cl. 3.
194 Id. § 4.
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appoint a particular person to a particular office, 95 nor could it
require him to appoint persons nominated or recommended by some-
one else. 9 6 Moreover, apart from the power of appointment, the
Constitution contemplates that the President will be responsible for
the execution of federal law, 97 and thus the Constitution implicitly
confers upon him a power to remove subordinate executive officers
in whom he does not have full confidence. 98 Without such a power
of removal, the President could not discharge his constitutional duty
to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Finally, and most im-
portantly, the Constitution contemplates that the officers of the United
States will owe allegiance to the United States. The allegiance re-
quirement arises implicitly from article II, section 4, which provides
that the officers of the United States shall be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of "treason."'
The provisions of the Treaty requiring Panamanian participation
on the Commission during the transition period obviously did not
comport with the implicit constitutional principles governing the ap-
pointment, removal, and allegiance of officers of the United States.
Persons who are nominated to the governing board of a federal
agency by a foreign power and are removable at the request of that
power are not "officers of the United States" in the constitutional
sense. Therefore, this feature of the Treaty raised the question whether
it was constitutional to allow persons who were not "officers of the
United States" to have a voice in the operation of the Canal during
the transition period.
Although the Supreme Court had not addressed this question as
of 1977, the analysis was straightforward. The Constitution did not
forbid the transfer of the Canal to Panama. Ultimately, it permitted
the United States to transfer control of the Canal to persons who
195 See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 80 (1916); 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 177 (1913); 29 Op. Att'y
Gen. 254 (1911); 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 516 (1871).
19 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 291 (1956). Congress may point out reasonable classes from
which appointments must be made, see 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 254, 256 (1911), and
may impose reasonable qualifications for certain offices. 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 164
(1873).
19 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
198 Bowsher v. Synar, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1925).
I" A person cannot commit "treason" unless he owes allegiance to the sovereign
against whom the "treason" is committed. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39
(1877).
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were not "officers of the United States" in the constitutional sense. 2°°
If the Treaty had given Panama a right to appoint and remove the
Secretary of State, it would have been unconstitutional. As John
Calhoun observed two centuries ago, no treaty could alter the fabric
of our government. 20 ' But the Canal was not part of the fabric of
our government, and the United States could transfer control of the
Canal to Panama. Moreover, the transfer mechanism, which gave
Panamanians a voice in the operation of the Canal during the tran-
sition period, was a reasonable means of accomplishing that objective.
The arrangement was unique, but in the Administration's view, the
arrangement was constitutional. 202 To date, the Administration's po-
sition has stood the test of time.
V. CONCLUSION
Shortly after the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of
1903, President Roosevelt asked his Attorney General, Philander
Knox, to construct a legal defense of the entire Panamanian affair.
The Attorney General responded, "[O]h, Mr. President, do not let
so great an achievement suffer from any taint of legality. "203 This
story is so appealing that it should be true, if it is not. On the other
hand, the United States is a nation under law, and one hopes that
it always will be a nation under law. The rule of law is the only
practical way to promote life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
the proper objectives of all government, according to Mr. Jefferson.
We do not know what Attorney General Knox would have said
of the new Panama Canal Treaty or of the passing of the old regime.
But from the standpoint of the rule of law, the demise of the old
Treaty was surely more becoming than its birth. In the case of the
Panama Canal Treaty, the constitutional machinery worked precisely
as the Framers thought it would. A democratic government, because
of its peculiar 18th century design, was able to make an unpopular
decision to advance the public good.
Was the decision wise? The procedure itself was some guarantee
of wisdom. Any proposal that survives four administrations and
200 See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907
(1978).
210 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 531 (1816) (remarks of Rep. Calhoun).
202 See Canal Operation under 1977 Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Panama Canal of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (statement of Mr. Foy) (1979).
203 D. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 8, at 383.
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receives the approval of two-thirds of the Senate must be a very sound
proposal indeed. History sometimes deals unkindly with even the wisest
plans. Many years will pass before a final verdict can be rendered
in the case of the Panama Canal. But the results thus far have been
encouraging. In light of the Canal Zone riots of 1964 and the recent
events in Nicaragua, one is inclined to believe that our position in
the Caribbean would be far less secure today if the President and
Senate had not taken the politically difficult course in 1977 and 1978.
James Madison and John Jay believed that the President and Senate
would be far-sighted in the conduct of foreign policy. The case of
the Panama Canal suggests that Madison and Jay were correct.
